Encomium of war

Pacifists argue that the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive war is a strategically bankrupt article of lunacy that should be abandoned regardless of whom sits in the oval office come Jan. 20, 2009. Frankly, I’m inclined to disagree.
My critics will point to the supposedly abject failure of the Bush Administration’s first and only pre-emptive war to date, Operation Iraqi Freedom. Many otherwise serious journalists mythologized the war as some kind of Oedipal revenge saga or Mephistophelian bargain of blood for oil.
Others, like Rolling Stone magazine, portrayed it as a military quagmire comparable to John F. Kennedy’s disastrous “police action” in Indochina. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid even derided it as “the worst foreign policy mistake” in American history.
Could the Iraq War really be a catastrophe on par with, let’s say, American isolationism in the wake of World War I? Those dignified moderates at MoveOn.org would argue that, since Saddam Hussein didn’t have any weapons of mass destruction, the answer is yes. But, by condemning a decision as complicated as the invasion of Iraq on the basis of a single failed premise, they reveal a crippling lack of strategic vision.
While Saddam probably did not have any WMD’s after 1998 his regime had retained its cadre of skilled scientists. According to a reliable Iraq Survey Group Report, he was waiting until sanctions were lifted in order to reconstitute his chemical and biological weapons programs. From what we now know of the UN Oil for Food scandal, and the slipshod enforcement of the no-fly zones, in early 2003 the sanctions regime was on the verge of collapse. While it would have been hard to predict exactly when, it’s clear that Saddam would eventually have replenished his stockpiles of Sarin and Mustard Gas.
In any case, as the notorious Downing Street Memo made clear, WMD’s were only part of the Iraq story. In the wake of Sept. 11 the United States needed to impose its power in the Middle East. Gulf Arab States like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the U.A.E were providing financing, logistics and ideological support for Al Qaeda. Syria and Iran had chemical weapons and a history of complicity with terrorists like Hezbollah. Diplomatic pressure was nearly useless and the United States military couldn’t invade them all. The only solution was to invade Iraq, dominate the region’s strategic center, and hopefully win some leverage on all of the more problematic states on its periphery.
In many ways the strategy worked. Saudi Arabia, the erstwhile American ally and the birthplace of Al Qaeda, began its first genuine crack down on fundamentalism. Syria, an avowed United States enemy, started handing over numerous Al Qaeda operatives for whom it had previously provided sanctuary.
In December 2003, Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi announced he would unilaterally give up his WMD programmes and allow unconditional inspections. At the time MI-6 believed that Libya was close to achieving a nuclear capability. Subsequent inspections revealed a large stockpile of chemical weapons. On Sept. 6, 2008, Libya was officially welcomed into the international community by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.
In the fall of 2003, the Iranians even temporarily halted their nuclear weapons program out of fear of an American invasion. Without the military threat of the Bush Doctrine these developments would have been impossible.
So, were the liberation of Iraq and the broader policy of pre-emptive war unmitigated successes? The four years of “Stay the Course” mentality, during which some 100-200,000 Iraqi civilians perished in ethnic strife, suggests they were not.
Scandals like Abu Ghraib and the Haditha massacre have tarnished the image of American power. And yet, Iraq is a flawed but maturing democracy, North Korea is dismantling its nuclear program, Libya is once again a member of the international community, and Syria is engaged in dialogue with Israel.
Of the original “Axis of Evil” only Iran persists as a threat to world peace. Although war is a blood curdling affair, and never a perfect tool of foreign policy, it is often a cruel necessity. I hope the next president of the United States appreciates this sentiment.